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ABSTRACT 
This paper undertakes a near real-time analysis of the income distribution effects of the 
COVID-19 crisis in Australia to understand the ongoing changes in the income distribution as 
well as the impact of policy responses. By semi-parametrically combining incomplete 
observed data from three different sources, namely, the Monthly Longitudinal Labour Force 
Survey, the Survey of Income and Housing and the administrative payroll data, we estimate 
the impact of COVID-19 and the associated policy responses on the Australian income 
distribution between February and June 2020, covering the immediate periods before and 
after the initial outbreak. Our results suggest that despite the growth in unemployment, the 
Gini of the equalised disposable income inequality dropped by nearly 0.03 point since 
February. The reduction is because of the additional wage subsidies and welfare supports 
offered as part of the policy response, offsetting a potential surge in income inequality. 
Additionally, the poverty rate, which could have been doubled in the absence of the 
government response, also reduced by 3 to 4 percentage points. The result shows the 
effectiveness of temporary policy measures in maintaining both the living standards and the 
level of income inequality. However, the heavy reliance on the support measures raises the 
possibility that the changes in the income distribution may be reversed and even substantially 
worsened off should the measures be withdrawn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: D31, H23 
Keywords: COVID-19, Australia, Income inequality, poverty  
 
1 Corresponding author. Email: jinjing.li@canberra.edu.au 
2 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic and the associated government response led to a significant shift in 
the norm of social and economic activities. Many governments worldwide have imposed 
various measures in the hope of containing the outbreak. Both the pandemic and the policy 
measures have wide-reaching and highly asymmetric implications on many aspects of life in 
most countries (Baker et al., 2020; Bonaccorsi et al., 2020; Mckibbin & Fernando, 2020). In 
Australia, all international travel has been banned since 20 March, and the government 
imposed extended lockdowns of its businesses in periods with rapid virus spread2. The border 
closure and lockdown, without a doubt, have had a significant impact on the economy, 
reflected in elevated unemployment levels. According to the National Skill Commission 
(2020), 17 of the 19 industries recorded reductions in employee jobs between mid-March and 
the end of May.  
The government announced several policy initiatives to minimise job losses and support 
families, particularly the ones relying on welfare payments. The measures include two 
payments of $750 to certain welfare recipients, temporarily doubling the base payment rate 
for unemployment and other selected benefits, a wage subsidy programme which provides 
affected businesses with a flat rate of $1500 a fortnight per eligible employee, and a temporary 
increase in child care subsidy.  
While the government has collected statistics to demonstrate the impact of the COVID-19 at 
the aggregate level such as industry, occupation, due to the absence of any compressive 
household survey, it is unclear how the pandemic has affected the living standard of the 
households and the level of income inequality. This information, however, is critical in 
understanding which sections of the population suffered the most from income fluctuations, 
which in turn supports formulating appropriate policy responses targeted to help those who 
were most affected.  
This paper aim is to undertake a near real-time analysis of the income distribution effects of 
the COVID-19 crisis in Australia to understand the ongoing changes in the income distribution 
in order to support appropriate policy design. We propose a calibrated income distribution 
estimation based upon: (i) actual data on changes in employment (both at the extensive and 
intensive margin) drawn from the up-to-date Monthly Longitudinal Labour Force Survey; (ii) 
administrative data on the changes of the earnings at the industry and age group level drawn 
from the Weekly Payroll Jobs and Wages in Australia; and (iii) the Survey of Income and 
Housing which is a comprehensive household income survey collected in 2017-18. While 
most countries are in a situation where there is lack of timely data required to understand 
the distributional impact of the crisis, we adopt a novel approach that builds upon the latest 
developments in nowcasting the income distribution using non-parametric tools and this 
unique combination of datasets available in Australia. The approach enables us to plausibly 
simulate the counterfactual distributions of income under the impact of the crisis.  
The paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we show that our proposed 
method can construct a near real-time household sample for income analyses from partially 
observed data, capturing the short-term economic changes and resembling the official 
statistics. Second, we provide the first estimates of the effects of the COVID-19 on the income 
distribution in Australia and show evidence on the heterogeneous effects based on individual-
 
2 For a complete timeline of Coronavirus outbreak in Australia and the government response, please 
refer to the News update archive from the Australian government website (Australia Government, 
2020). 
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level data. Third, we estimate the contribution of the government response in stabilising the 
income distribution, showing the importance and the level of reliance on the temporary 
measures.  
II.    STATE-OF-THE-ART IN NOWCASTING AND ITS NEED IN TIMES OF CRISIS 
Modelling the socio-economic consequences of a shock is vital to inform policy decision-
making (Bok et al., 2018). The COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent restriction to control 
its spread have not only caused a downturn in the economic performance marked by negative 
GDP growth (Mckibbin & Fernando, 2020), but is likely to affect the levels of poverty and 
income inequality (Bonaccorsi et al., 2020). Given how widespread COVID-19 is globally and 
how restrictive social measures are, it is crucial to understand the impact of the crisis on 
inequality and poverty in a timely manner in order to formulate appropriate policy responses. 
Historically, major economic shocks tend to induce changes in income inequality. In the 
1997-1999 Asian Financial crisis, South Korea was one of the worst-hit economies among 
developed countries with contracted GDP, rising unemployment and sharply worsened 
income inequality (Cheong, 2001). The 2008 global financial crisis has severely affected all EU 
Member States with a plunge in real GDP ranging from 5 per cent in Cyprus to 40 per cent 
in Latvia (De Beer, 2012). The unemployment rose rapidly, and the governments in the EU 
introduced fiscal interventions with unemployment and welfare benefits. Nevertheless, 
income inequality increased in many countries. Although most EU countries started to 
recover in the new decade, many governments have accumulated substantial debt 
(Matsaganis & Leventi, 2014). This highlights the need for the government to come up with 
a well-targeted policy as well as a careful allocation of resources to avoid plunging into 
austerity after the initial stimulus (Matsaganis & Leventi, 2014).  
While members of the society can feel the changes in the economic activities almost 
immediately after the spread of COVID-19, the statistics to understand the current state of the 
economy are often limited and will only be available with a significant time lag (Chetty et al., 
2020). Detailed household information is rarely available in a timely manner given that most 
household surveys are collected annually (or less frequent) due to the substantial cost 
involved. Thus, there is always a non-negligible gap between data collection and its release 
for research, which restricts the analysis of a sudden event, such as the spread of COVID-19.   
To overcome this gap, an increasing number of studies resorted to adapting the Nowcasting 
technique to represent statistics of the present state, the recent past and the near future by 
updating the latest collected data with up-to-date external statistics or controls (Bańbura et 
al., 2013). While the idea originated in meteorology, economists have adapted the technique 
to estimate timely economic indicators. Giannone et al. (2008) have used 200 macroeconomic 
indicators for the US economy such as industrial production, employment, financial variables, 
prices, wages, money and credit aggregates, surveys from other sources, and other 
conjunctural measures to nowcast GDP growth. They highlighted the importance of 
indicators that are updated to reflect the present time, such as consumer confidence index, 
unemployment insurance weekly claims report, interest rates, foreign exchange rates, stock 
exchange and S & P indices. More recently, nowcasting techniques have been applied to 
produce current estimates of poverty and income inequality. Some research use inflation 
indexation, adjusting proportionally the industry-specific employment rates combined with 
a tax-benefit simulator to evaluate the policy impact of various tax-benefit rules (Navicke et 
al., 2014).  
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A few European countries have analysed the impact of COVID-19 based on the Nowcast 
approach. Examples include Beirne et al. (2020) and O’Donoghue et al. (2020) for Ireland, 
Figari & Fiorio (2020) for Italy, Bronka et al. (2020) and Brewer & Gardiner (2020) for the UK. 
In the case of UK, earnings subsidies were found to cushion household income across the 
entire distribution, providing the primary insurance mechanism against the adverse income 
shock; existing tax-benefit rules were found to complement this scheme in providing social 
protection. In the case of Ireland, O’Donoghue et al (2020) find that the crisis-induced income-
support policy responses (wage subsidies, pandemic-related unemployment and sickness 
benefits) combined with existing progressive elements of the tax-benefit system were 
effective in counteracting the increase in income inequality in the early months of the 
pandemic.  
The existing nowcast approaches used, however, rely heavily on parametric assumptions 
regarding the changes in the labour market. The analyses tend to assume the changes both 
in the extensive and intensive margin are either stochastic or based on the parametric 
regressions derived from the pre-crisis household survey. The implicit assumption of the 
labour market transition is random or remains stable in the event of the crisis may not always 
hold, especially when shocks are expected to have highly heterogeneous impacts across the 
population. To address this limit, this paper proposes a semi-parametric nowcast approach 
combining multiple incomplete microdata as well as administrative statistics for estimations 
of the income distribution, exploiting the availabilities of both the comprehensive household 
survey as well as the shorter monthly labour force survey in Australia. 
III.    DATA 
As a comprehensive household survey is not available to capture the pre- and post- changes 
in the income distribution, we reconstruct the income distribution profiles by combining 
three different datasets that describe the evolution of the labour market in Australia. 
Specifically, this includes the monthly longitudinal labour force survey (LLFS), the biannual 
survey of income and housing (SIH), and the weekly payroll statistics. All datasets are 
collected by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
The Longitudinal Labour Force Survey (LLFS)  provides details on geography, demography 
(e.g., age, sex, educational attainment, family characteristics), the labour market participation 
(e.g., hours worked, industry, occupation, details of the last job) and the transitions into and 
out of the employment of Australians (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2020b). The data 
however, does not contain any income information. The current LLFS consists of over 400 
waves since 1982. Each monthly survey collects around 50,000 observations sampled from 
private dwellings and is representative of the population aged 15 or older. Given the rotation 
design of the sampling, 80-85% of the observations are retained in the successive wave.  
The study uses the waves between February 2020 and June 2020 (5 waves) which covers the 
periods immediately before and after the COVID-19 starting to spread in Australia. The 
selection of the data period allows us to capture the effect of the COVID-19 progression in 
Australia.  
The second data source we use is the Survey of Income and Housing (SIH) 2017-18, which 
collects data on demographics (e.g., sex, age, marital status), housing, labour force 
characteristics, education, income, assets and childcare (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). 
At the individual level, the SIH provides detailed information of those living in private 
dwellings on their labour force status, the number of jobs currently held, weekly hours 
worked, duration of unemployment as well as detailed income information. Our study uses 
the 2017-18 version of the SIH, which includes the final sample of 14,060 households and 
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provides detailed industry and occupation information that enables us to match with the 
changes in the monthly LLFS to examine the likely consequence of the income distribution 
due to COVID-19. 
To refine the modelling of the heterogeneous shock which affects earnings across different 
industries, occupations, and demographic profiles, we further incorporate a longitudinal 
dataset of Weekly Payroll Jobs and Wages which is sourced from the administrative data, 
covering businesses with Single Touch Payroll (STP)-enabled payroll or accounting software 
and is provided to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). STP generally covers all employers 
in Australia since July 2019 unless an exemption is granted. This data includes changes in 
payroll jobs, changes in total wages paid, and changes in average weekly wages per job 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2020a). This data is also linked with other administrative data 
from the Australian taxation system to determine additional classification attributes (e.g. age 
and sex of employees).   
The three datasets can be understood as the different projections of the socio-economic 
profiles of Australia, although each alone does not provide sufficient information for our 
analyses. The combination of the three sources of data can offer a more complete picture of 
the socio-economic changes. Additionally, as the information related to the labour market 
change, the primary venue of the shocks of COVID-19, is already captured in the data, there 
is less of a need to specific parametric equations to model to the evolution of the labour 
market, avoiding many restrictive assumptions. The use of multiple unit-record datasets 
enables us to reconstruct the socio-economic profile semi-parametrically to reflect the 
observed changes due to COVID-19, unlike most of the existing nowcast approach in the 
literature.   
IV.    METHODOLOGY 
General Estimation Strategy 
Given the time since the COVID-19 outbreak in Australia, we focus on the short-term change 
in income distribution. We also assume factors other than COVID-19 such as demographic 
change and other unpredicted events are negligible in reshaping the income distribution in 
the immediate periods after the lockdown. The changes of the income distribution can 
therefore be decomposed into two main parts, with one being the change induced by the 
income shock (part A) and the other due to the government policy response (part B): 
Δ𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝1,𝑦𝑦1) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦0)= 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦1∗ ) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦0)������������� +
Income Shock Effect (A) 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝1,𝑦𝑦1) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦1∗)�������������Policy Response Effect (B) (1) 
where I is an outcome measure calculated from the entire income distribution (e.g., average 
disposable income, Gini index, poverty rate etc.), p is the government COVID-19 response 
policies and y is the distribution of the gross market income. The subscript 0 refers to the 
pre-COVID-19 baseline period, which is February 2020, and the subscript 1 refers to the 
periods after the initial spread of COVID-19, ranging between April and June 20203. We use 
𝑦𝑦1
∗ to denote the unobserved gross market income distribution sans the policy intervention 
after the initial spread of COVID-19.  
Equation (1) resembles a similar decomposition framework which quantifies the contribution 
of the specific component to inequality changes between two points in time using a 
 
3  As March can be considered as a transitory month in terms of both policy measures and the 
propagation of the economic shocks, we generally do not interpret the results from March. 
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counterfactual simulation approach (Bargain et al., 2017; Bargain & Callan, 2010).  Part A in 
Equation (1) captures the changes in income distribution due to the change in the market 
income. As COVID-19 dominates the income shock between Feb 2020 and June 2020, we 
assume that most (if not all) changes in Part A can be attributed to COVID-19. Part B captures 
the policy changes and their effects on income distribution. As all changes in the policies are 
part of the government response to COVID-19, the effect of B is also a measure of the 
effectiveness of the policy response in stabilising the market income shock via welfare 
policies. It should be noted that Equation (1) does not incorporate the interaction term of the 
two major components as the policy response can only be meaningfully interpreted 
conditional on the existence of COVID-19. Therefore, a sequential decomposition framework 
becomes more suitable in this particular analysis. The outcome measures in this paper include 
the mean and the Gini of the gross market income as well as the equivalised disposable 
income. Additionally, we decompose the changes in the poverty rate by holding the poverty 
line constant at the pre-COVID-19 level. 
The estimation of the Equation (1) replies on the estimation of three income distributions4, 
namely the pre-COVID-19 income distribution 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦0) , the COVID-19 income distribution 
𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝1,𝑦𝑦1), and the counterfactual COVID-19 income distribution without any policy response 
𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦1∗). We use the samples from February to estimate 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦0) and the samples from a 
month later than March to estimate 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝1,𝑦𝑦1) . The more challenging part of the 
decomposition is the estimation of 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦1∗), where we need to simulate the likely outcome 
should there be no welfare policy intervention (𝑝𝑝0) amid the COVID-19 market income shock 
(𝑦𝑦1). The estimation can be difficult due to the nature of the shock as well as the complex 
behaviour response associated with it. More specifically, we do not know the demand of the 
labour market if the government does not provide the subsidy that affects approximately 3.5 
million jobs (Australian Treasury, 2020). To accommodate the possible behavioural and 
market responses, instead of providing a point estimate with a strong assumption, we 
estimate the upper and the lower bound of 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦1∗) using two extreme estimates: 
• Lower bound estimate: we assume no job will be lost should the government 
withdraw the additional subsidies to the employers;  
• Upper bound estimate: we assume that all subsidised jobs would be lost should there 
be no subsidy.  
Although neither estimate above is realistic, the range is sufficiently large to provide a robust 
estimate of the term A and B in Equation (1). The difference between the two estimates 
reflects the uncertainty in the behavioural response. It is most likely that the most realistic 
counterfactual resides somewhere in between these two extreme estimates. 
Constructing Demographics, Labour Market and Income Distributions 
To capture the changes in the demographic and employment while retaining the income 
information,  we estimate a set of the new weights of the latest Survey of Income and Housing 
(SIH) to mimic the demographic and employment patterns observed in the monthly 
Longitudinal Labour Force Surveys (LLFS), both before and after the initial spread of COVID-
19. We follow the semi-parametric method by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) to adjust 
 
4 The estimation of (1) can also be done using a different path of the decomposition, where 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝1,𝑦𝑦0) 
can be used as a counterfactual instead of  𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝0,𝑦𝑦1∗). This is sometimes referred as the path dependency 
issue. However, the measure 𝐼𝐼(𝑝𝑝1 ,𝑦𝑦0) does not have a meaningful interpretation as the COVID-19 
policy response will exist only when COVID-19 takes place. We therefore adopt the sequential 
decomposition approach as in the main text. 
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the weight of each observation in the 2017-18 SIH with an estimated ratio. Specifically, the 
weight of an individual 𝑖𝑖 from SIH (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,SIH) is updated using the Bayesian rule: 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,SIH→LLFS = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,SIH Pr(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|LLFS)Pr(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|SIH) = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,SIH Pr(LLFS|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)Pr(SIH|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) γ (2) 
where Pr(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|LLFS)  and Pr(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|SIH)  are the conditional probabilities of observing the 
characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 in the LLFS and SIH dataset respectively; Pr(LLFS|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) and Pr(SIH|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) are 
the probabilities of observation with characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  drawn from LLFS and SIH, 
respectively.  The characteristics vector 𝑋𝑋 contains: 
• demographic characteristics (age, age squared, marital status, gender, oversea born); 
• employment characteristics (industry, occupation, usual hours of working, number 
of jobs, duration of unemployment, and their interactions with gender and age); 
• household characteristics (number of young kids, size of the household and state in 
which the household resides). 
The ratio 𝛾𝛾 can be interpreted as the prior, which is the relative ratio of the dataset size. To 
ensure the weighted total population in our model matches the expected national population, 
we adjust the ratio slightly to reflect the population growth between the time of the SIH 
collection and 2020.  The implicit assumption behind our approach is that observed changes 
in the intensive and extensive margins of the labour market can be effectively described 
through the semi-parametric process, and the income distribution, conditional on the 
observed characteristics including the working hours and the employment status remains 
largely stable other than the wage level adjustment reflected by the payroll information. This 
also mimics the short-term inelasticity of the conditional wage rate due to contracts and the 
labour law. 
Besides the distributional adjustment, all income items including wage, investment income, 
and certain expenses are also indexed to account for the income growth between the time of 
SIH collection and the month of the analyses. Specifically: 
• The wage income is indexed using ABS-published Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) 
growth rate between 2018 and February 2020. Since March 2020, we use the ABS 
weekly payroll information to reflect the heterogeneous wage shock across different 
industries and age groups. The monthly wage growth (or decline) is estimated from 
the changes in the administrative payroll statistics by industry and age group.  
• The investment income is assumed to grow at a real return of 2.5% between 2018 and 
early 2020. To reflect the volatility of COVID-19 on the financial market, we use the 
default portfolio performance of the largest pension fund in Australia (Australian 
Super, 2020) to index the investment income between February and June 2020. Figure 
A in the Appendix plots the portfolio performance since January 2020. 
• The rest of the income and the childcare expenses are indexed using the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). The childcare expenditure is used for the post-childcare disposable 
income estimation. 
Modelling Policy Responses to the COVID-19 Crisis 
In response to the COVID-induced economic shocks, the Australian government announced 
several temporary taxation and welfare benefit changes that directly affect the employment 
and the income level of the households, including a one-off payment for specific welfare 
recipients, increased unemployment and other benefits, the temporary free childcare support, 
and wage subsidies to employees via eligible employers.  
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In March 2020, the government announced a one-off economic support payment of $1500 to 
nearly existing recipients of specific welfare payment, including pensions, unemployment 
benefits (Jobseekers) and Family Tax Benefit (FTB). The majority of recipients received the 
first payments ($750) by mid-April, and the second payment ($750) was made starting from 
mid-July. Besides one-off payments, the government also introduced a temporary payment 
of $550 per fortnight, known as the Coronavirus Supplement, to eligible welfare payment 
recipients who receive unemployment benefit (Jobseeker), parenting payment, youth 
allowances or other payment. The unemployment benefit has also been doubled to $1,115.70 
per fortnight while its eligibility criteria were relaxed as recipients do not need to fulfill their 
usual job searching obligations (as known as “mutual obligation”). Additionally, the taper 
rate, which determines the reduction of the payment when the partner’s income exceeds the 
threshold, has also been temporarily changed (Centrelink, 2020). In the meantime, asset 
testing has also been suspended for selected benefits (Centrelink, 2020). 
Along with the changes in direct welfare payments, the government also provides full 
subsidies to childcare services for approximately three months from the start of April to the 
end of June. The measure intends to help childcare providers stay open and keep employees 
in their jobs. The usual income and activity test for childcare subsidy were suspended during 
the period. The spending is projected at $1.6 billion in costs of the relief package over three 
months. 
To estimate the impact of the policy changes, we use the latest version of an Australian tax-
transfer model STINMOD+ to calculate household disposable income based on the 
corresponding tax and social transfer rules, including the aforementioned COVID-19 stimulus 
and the policy changes in direct welfare payment and childcare subsidy. The model covers 
all personal taxation and federally administered welfare payments and replicates the 
implementation of the social security system, incorporating elements such as income and 
asset testing. As the Australian welfare system is highly means-tested, and the vast majority 
of the eligible conditions do not depend on previous contributions or complex employment 
history, we can estimate the welfare payment with relatively high accuracy. As the take-up 
rate of means-tested benefits in Australia is generally high with a relatively low stigma (Mood, 
2006), we assume full take-up in our simulation. 
To reflect the relaxed job search requirement in the unemployment benefit, we assume all 
individuals losing their jobs since February are eligible for the unemployment benefit even if 
they are not actively seeking jobs. We use LLFS to estimate the propensity of that one was 
employed in any wave since February prior to being out of labour force with a standard probit 
model (see Table B in the Appendix for the model specification) and applied the coefficients 
to the SIH data to simulate the additional eligibility of unemployment benefit for those who 
are currently out of the labour force.  
Additional to the increased welfare payment, the government also announced a wage subsidy 
package called ‘JobKeeper’, providing eligible employers with a flat rate of $1,500 AUD per 
fortnight per employee, irrespective of prior or current hours and earnings. To be eligible, 
employers have to show that their turnover has reduced by at least 50 percent for large firms 
and 30 percent for smaller firms during the pandemic (Australian Treasury, 2020). The flat 
payment rate means that many eligible part-time or long-term casual employees can earn 
more than their regular pay. A recent review from the Australian Treasury suggests that the 
JobKeeper program has covered over 920,000 organisations and around 3.5 million 
individuals during April and May 2020, with a total payment of exceeding $20 billion  
(Australian Treasury, 2020).  
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As we do not have the employer-employee data that contains the eligibility status of the Job 
Keeper program, we need to simulate who is among the 3.5 million recipients as reported by 
the administrative data. Because the wage subsidy is only given to employers with severe 
financial difficulties and the intention is to retain jobs that would otherwise be at risk of 
disappearance, we assume the likelihood of receiving the benefit can be approximated by the 
immediate risk of losing the job. We use a standard probit model (see Table C in the Appendix 
for the model specification) to estimate the one’s propensity of losing the job in the next wave 
(month), conditional on being employed in LLFS and apply the conditional probability to the 
SIH data. A common alignment algorithm is used to ensure the simulation will have the exact 
number of recipients matching the administrative data (Li & O’Donoghue., 2014).  
V.    RESULTS 
Validation - Comparisons between the observed and modelled distribution 
Before discussing the results from the estimated income distribution, it is crucial to assess 
whether the proposed method can construct a satisfactory distribution. For an evolving 
income distribution affected by a sudden shock on the labour market, one would expect that 
the estimated distribution to be sensitive to changes in the labour market conditions, whereas 
the general demographic distribution should remain mostly constant. An excessive deviation 
from the baseline demographic profile means that the reweighting process struggles to adjust 
the weight using observations available in the original survey data.  
Table 1 describes the main demographic characteristics of the original SIH dataset, the up to 
date LLFS dataset and the constructed dataset based on the semi-parametric reweighting. As 
shown, the result from the nowcast model generally falls between the two datasets, 
suggesting a stable demographic profile. 
Table 1 Comparison between modelled and observed demographic profile (Feb 2020) 
Variable SIH LLFS Modelled 
Proportion of population between 15-24 15.7% 16.0% 15.7% 
Proportion of population between 25-64 65.7% 66.6% 65.3% 
Proportion of population 65+ 18.6% 17.4% 19.0% 
Proportion of Male 49.0% 49.4% 49.2% 
Proportion of socially married 61.0% 59.8% 59.5% 
Australian born 65.9% 67.1% 67.0% 
Education bachelor or higher 27.8% 29.0% 28.6% 
Number of children under 15 in the household 0.52 0.55 0.54 
Table 2 compares the changes in the simulated unemployment rate versus the official 
unemployment rate published by the Australian Statistical Bureau between February 2020 
and June 2020. The model result, especially, the longitudinal change between March and April 
indicates that the method can capture the changes in the employment distribution. In the 
baseline month (February), the difference between the simulated and the official 
unemployment rate is less than 0.1 percentage point. In other months, the differences are 
generally small with the maximum discrepancy observed in June. Results from a sub-
population, e.g. youth unemployment, is less accurate due to the reduced number of 
observations although the results are generally comparable. As each month’s distribution is 
estimated separately, variations also come from statistical uncertainties such as sampling 
errors and the use of the random numbers in the simulation. Throughout the paper, we report 
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all estimates between February and June (with April to June as the COVID-19 affected period) 
to more accurately assess the robustness of the results. 
Table 2 Unemployment Rate compared with official figures 
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
Youth Unemployment 
 
 
Modelled Official 
 
Modelled Official 
 
Feb 5.45% 5.52% 
 
13.14% 13.18% 
 
Mar 5.69% 5.57% 
 
13.74% 12.64% 
 
Apr 6.66% 6.43% 
 
15.21% 14.21% 
 
May 6.90% 6.92% 
 
15.20% 15.19% 
 
Jun 8.66% 7.25% 
 
18.88% 15.64% 
 
Changes in Labour Market and the Income Distribution 
Table 3 reports the estimated propensity of dropping out of employment conditional on being 
employed in the previous period across income quintiles. Two patterns become apparent. 
First, the likelihood of dropping out generally falls as income increases, even at the height of 
the COVID-19 lockdown. This pattern echoes what has been observed in other crises caused 
by external shocks, namely that job security is affected differently across the income 
distribution (Baldacci et al., 2002). Second, the propensity of dropping out of employment 
exhibits an increasing trend between February and April 2020, followed by a decline in May 
and June 2020. The change in the probability also mirrors the intensity of the COVID-19 
shocks over time: the main effects are observed in March-May, followed by a stabilising 
labour market trend starting in May 2020. This bounce-back pattern may also reflect that the 
government interventions that have commenced in March 2020 started to have an impact. 
Similar to previous crises, the COVID-19 shock also displays a differential impact across 
industries and income levels. Those employed but in the lowest income quintile were the 
hardest hit by losing their jobs in April 2020. These include those who work in the Arts and 
Recreation Services and Accommodation and Food Services sectors, the two most contracted 
sectors between February and May 2020 (See Table D in Appendix). Both industries suffered 
due to the impact of border closure and travel or mobility restrictions. 
Table 3 Estimated propensity of dropping out of employment, conditional on being employed 
in the previous month, by market income quintile (wage and business income). 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
February 2.66% 1.47% 1.08% 0.85% 0.71% 
March 6.87% 3.00% 2.46% 2.13% 2.12% 
April 14.17% 6.13% 4.18% 3.12% 2.58% 
May 10.31% 4.58% 3.07% 2.27% 1.78% 
June 6.97% 3.19% 2.45% 2.03% 1.84% 
Table 4 reports the estimated average monthly household gross market income by pre-COVID 
quintiles of equivalised household disposable income in dollar amount and the percentage 
change compared with the pre-COVID period, taking into account the observed changes in 
the labour force participation as well as working hours. The market income change shows 
the extent of the COVID-19 shock as well as the impact of the government wage subsidy 
program (JobKeeper) in pre-tax earnings. In the pre-COVID period, the estimates show the 
gross household incomes are mostly stable. In May 2020, gross market income increased for 
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most quintiles, with over 20% for Q1. Q5 is the only exception, where we observe an initial 
decline of the gross income in April but a gradual recovery since then.  
The increase in gross market incomes between April and June in the lower quintiles can 
largely be attributed to the wage subsidy scheme and the increased welfare benefit as shown 
by the estimates without policy responses. In the lower bound estimates, where we assume 
that all jobs which are currently supported by the JobKeeper and the welfare support schemes 
are gone, a significant decline in gross earning is expected throughout the distribution. In the 
upper bound estimates, where no JobKeeper supported jobs are lost, the changes in gross 
incomes are generally less than a few percentage points. The actual impact of the wage 
subsidy on labour demand is likely in between those two extreme estimates. The difference 
between the nowcast estimates and the estimates without the policy change shows the 
substantial impact of the policy change, especially for households in Q1 and Q2.  
Table 4 Estimated household monthly market income (labour, business, investment) by pre-
COVID equivalised household disposable income quintiles  
  Monthly Gross Income (A$)  % Change Compared to February 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Before COVID-19       
 February 897 3508 7563 11749 22635       
 March 889 3474 7548 11738 22660  -0.9% -1.0% -0.2% -0.1% 0.1% 
Nowcast Model       
 April 1098 3764 7895 12070 22445  22.4% 7.3% 4.4% 2.7% -0.8% 
 May 1110 3801 7941 12112 22622  23.7% 8.4% 5.0% 3.1% -0.1% 
 June 1069 3641 7879 12092 22757  19.2% 3.8% 4.2% 2.9% 0.5% 
Without policy response (lower estimates)       
 April 730 2743 6042 9326 19127  -18.6% -21.8% -20.1% -20.6% -15.5% 
 May 723 2685 6001 9267 19224  -19.4% -23.5% -20.7% -21.1% -15.1% 
 June 708 2608 5916 9129 18818  -21.1% -25.7% -21.8% -22.3% -16.9% 
Without policy response (upper estimates)       
 April 888 3457 7561 11754 22277  -0.9% -1.5% 0.0% 0.0% -1.6% 
 May 903 3479 7609 11804 22455  0.7% -0.8% 0.6% 0.5% -0.8% 
 June 869 3379 7570 11806 22591  -3.2% -3.7% 0.1% 0.5% -0.2% 
Following the decomposition framework as set out in the methodology section, we estimate 
the contributions from the income shock effect and the government policy response to the 
overall changes in the income. Table 5 reports the estimates and the range derived from the 
counterfactuals. The term “Low” is used in the table to indicate the lower bound estimates 
and the term “High” for the upper bound estimates. As shown, the income shock effect, which 
corresponds to term A in Equation (1), contributes to a maximum of a hundred dollars decline 
to the gross income for the lower-income household to up to a few thousand dollars for the 
high-income households. The policy response effect, which corresponds to the term B in the 
Equation (1), generally negates the decline induced by the income shock effect and 
contributes to an increase of a few hundred to a few thousand dollars a month to household 
market income. Overall, the income shock due to COVID-19 contributes a maximum of 15-
25.7% to the decline in the gross income depending on the quintile, and the policy response 
contributes up to 43.1% of the pre-COVID gross income for households in Q1 and up to 30% 
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for households in other quintiles. The net effect is what we observed in Table 4, with the 
impact being highly heterogeneous across quintiles. 
Table 5 Estimated contributions of COVID-19 income shock effect and policy response effect 
to changes in monthly household market income by pre-COVID equivalised disposable 
income quintiles 
  
Q1 
 
Q2 
 
Q3 
 
Q4 
 
Q5   
Low High 
 
Low High 
 
Low High 
 
Low High 
 
Low High 
Income Shock Effect (A$)  
April -167 -8 
 
-764 -51 
 
-1522 -2 
 
-2423 5 
 
-3508 -358  
May -174 7 
 
-823 -29 
 
-1562 45 
 
-2483 55 
 
-3411 -180  
June -189 -28 
 
-900 -129 
 
-1648 7 
 
-2620 57 
 
-3817 -43 
Policy Response Effect (A$)  
April 210 368 
 
308 1021 
 
333 1853 
 
315 2743 
 
168 3318  
May 206 387 
 
322 1116 
 
332 1940 
 
309 2846 
 
167 3398  
June 201 361 
 
262 1033 
 
309 1963 
 
287 2963 
 
166 3939 
Income Shock Effect (Percentage of pre-COVID income)  
April -18.6% -0.9%  -21.8% -1.5%  -20.1% 0.0%  -20.6% 0.0%  -15.5% -1.6%  
May -19.4% 0.7%  -23.5% -0.8%  -20.7% 0.6%  -21.1% 0.5%  -15.1% -0.8%  
June -21.1% -3.2%  -25.7% -3.7%  -21.8% 0.1%  -22.3% 0.5%  -16.9% -0.2% 
Policy Response Effect (Percentage of pre-COVID income)  
April 23.4% 41.0%  8.8% 29.1%  4.4% 24.5%  2.7% 23.4%  0.7% 14.7%  
May 23.0% 43.1%  9.2% 31.8%  4.4% 25.6%  2.6% 24.2%  0.7% 15.0%  
June 22.4% 40.3%  7.5% 29.5%  4.1% 26.0%  2.4% 25.2%  0.7% 17.4% 
Table 6 reports the changes in equivalised household disposable income after childcare cost 
by pre-COVID quintiles, in absolute amounts and relative changes. We deduct the childcare 
cost from the disposable income as consumption of childcare services changed significantly 
due to COVID-19 and the government policy-response. In general, we observe a similar 
pattern as in Tables 4. The largest changes in equivalised disposable income levels are found 
in Q1 and Q2, with an increase of around 24% and 9% respectively. It should be noted that 
while the analysis shows an average improvement in the disposable income in the lower 
quintiles, it does not suggest all families are better off. The heterogeneity of shocks means 
that some individuals may be better off than the group average, while others could be 
significantly worse off, especially those who lost their jobs.  
The impact of COVID-19 outbreak would have been greater if there had been no policy 
response. Disposable income could have contracted by 3-4% for Q1 and by around 10% for Q2 
in the worst-case scenario. Due to the inability to access means-tested welfare payment for 
the higher income groups, Q3-Q5 would have suffered more percentage-wise due to job losses, 
although they are still better off in absolute term. Across all results, the variations over time 
between April and June tend to be small. As each month is estimated independently, the 
stability of the numeric results is a welcoming sign, suggesting the robustness of the results 
derived from the semi-parametric approach.  
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Table 6 Estimated monthly equivalised household disposable income by pre-COVID 
equivalised disposable income quintiles 
  Monthly Disposable Income (A$)  % Change Compared to February 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Before COVID-19       
 February 1872 2826 4006 5541 9997       
 March 1864 2812 4006 5557 9922  -0.5% -0.5% 0.0% 0.3% -0.7% 
Nowcast Model       
 April 2311 3087 4191 5670 9940  23.5% 9.2% 4.6% 2.3% -0.6% 
 May 2322 3083 4162 5621 9866  24.0% 9.1% 3.9% 1.4% -1.3% 
 June 2322 3078 4206 5694 10041  24.0% 8.9% 5.0% 2.7% 0.4% 
Without policy response (lower estimates)       
 April 1808 2542 3380 4557 8595  -3.4% -10.1% -15.6% -17.8% -14.0% 
 May 1800 2514 3334 4475 8490  -3.8% -11.1% -16.8% -19.2% -15.1% 
 June 1816 2539 3379 4485 8440  -3.0% -10.2% -15.7% -19.1% -15.6% 
Without policy response (upper estimates)       
 April 1881 2846 4049 5606 9934  0.5% 0.7% 1.1% 1.2% -0.6% 
 May 1880 2838 4021 5562 9857  0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% -1.4% 
 June 1888 2840 4060 5627 10020  0.8% 0.5% 1.4% 1.6% 0.2% 
 
Table 7 Estimated contributions of COVID-19 income shock effect and policy response effect 
to changes in equivalised disposable income by pre-COVID equivalised disposable income 
quintiles 
  
Q1 
 
Q2 
 
Q3 
 
Q4 
 
Q5   
Low High 
 
Low High 
 
Low High 
 
Low High 
 
Low High 
Income Shock Effect (A$) 
  April -64 9 
 
-284 20 
 
-626 43 
 
-984 65 
 
-1401 -62  
May -72 7 
 
-312 12 
 
-672 15 
 
-1066 21 
 
-1507 -139  
June -56 16 
 
-287 14 
 
-627 54 
 
-1056 86 
 
-1556 23 
Policy Response Effect (A$)  
April 430 503 
 
241 545 
 
142 811 
 
64 1113 
 
5 1344  
May 442 521 
 
245 569 
 
141 828 
 
59 1146 
 
8 1376  
June 434 506 
 
238 539 
 
146 827 
 
66 1208 
 
21 1600 
Income Shock Effect (Percentage of pre-COVID income)  
April -3.4% 0.5% 
 
-10.1% 0.7% 
 
-15.6% 1.1% 
 
-17.8% 1.2% 
 
-14.0% -0.6%  
May -3.8% 0.4% 
 
-11.1% 0.4% 
 
-16.8% 0.4% 
 
-19.2% 0.4% 
 
-15.1% -1.4%  
June -3.0% 0.8% 
 
-10.2% 0.5% 
 
-15.7% 1.4% 
 
-19.1% 1.6% 
 
-15.6% 0.2% 
Policy Response Effect (Percentage of pre-COVID income)  
April 23.0% 26.9% 
 
8.5% 19.3% 
 
3.5% 20.2% 
 
1.2% 20.1% 
 
0.1% 13.4%  
May 23.6% 27.9% 
 
8.7% 20.2% 
 
3.5% 20.7% 
 
1.1% 20.7% 
 
0.1% 13.8%  
June 23.2% 27.0% 
 
8.4% 19.1% 
 
3.6% 20.6% 
 
1.2% 21.8% 
 
0.2% 16.0% 
Table 7 provides the estimates of the contributions from the COVID-19 and policy response to 
changes in disposable income. Compared with the estimates of the gross income as in Table 
14 
 
6, the absolute dollar amount change is generally lower, suggesting the automatic stabilising 
effect of the existing tax and benefit system. The equivalised disposable income level for Q1 
households would only have minor changes with or without any direct policy response as 
existing welfare payment is an important source of income which is unaffected by the COVID-
19 outbreak. Households in Q2 to Q5 would have experienced a larger reduction under a no 
policy response scenario. The income shock effect would account for up to 20% of the 
reduction of disposable income in the worst-case scenario. The policy response effect is a net 
positive for all quintiles, responsible for the increase in disposable incomes, as we observed 
in Table 6, with Q1 households benefiting the most.    
Table 8 further breaks down the changes reported in Table 7 into the effect of the temporary 
free childcare, the effect of the change in gross incomes, which captures the employment 
stock as well as the wage subsidy, and the rest (welfare policy changes, as well as the 
interactions between the existing welfare system and the income shock). The change in 
disposable income is dominated by the increased level of welfare for Q1. Gross income change 
becomes a more important factor relative to others from Q2 onwards, becoming the primary 
driver for changes in disposable income for the wealthiest households. Free childcare has 
only a limited impact on the final disposable income, contributing around half a percentage 
point to the total change of the equivalised disposable income as it only affects the out-of-
pocket portion of a service that is already heavily subsidised. 
Table 8 Contributions of free childcare and gross income shock (including JobKeeper 
subsidy) on the estimated changes in equivalised household disposable income by equivalised 
household disposable income quintile (%) 
  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
April Total Change 23.5% 9.2% 4.6% 2.3% -0.6%  
Free Childcare 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6%  
Gross Income  5.6% 3.8% 3.1% 1.9% -1.9%  
Rest 17.4% 4.7% 0.7% -0.3% 0.7% 
May Total Change 24.0% 9.1% 3.9% 1.4% -1.3%  
Free Childcare 0.4% 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6%  
Gross Income 5.8% 4.3% 3.3% 2.1% -1.3%  
Rest 17.8% 4.1% -0.3% -1.3% -0.6% 
June Total Change 24.0% 8.9% 5.0% 2.7% 0.4% 
 Free Childcare 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 
 Gross Income 4.6% 1.4% 2.4% 1.7% -0.7% 
 Rest 18.9% 6.8% 1.7% 0.4% 0.6% 
Changes in Inequality 
This section examines how the changes observed across the distribution are reflected in the 
changes in the market income inequality (for everyone in age between 15 and 64) and 
disposable income inequality. The nowcast estimates in Table 9 suggest that gross income 
inequality has been relatively stable over time except for June, where there is almost a 0.02 
point increase compared with February. However, when decomposing the change into the 
income shock effect and the policy response effect, it becomes clear that the COVID-19 income 
shock would cause an increase in gross income inequality ranging between 0.016 to 0.14 Gini 
points in April-June relative to February. The impact, however, is almost entirely negated by 
the policy effect due to the introduction of the wage subsidy. This finding is robust across 
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both two extreme estimates. As the estimates include both positive and negative numbers, 
we do not use the term “lower” or “upper” estimates in this table to avoid confusions. Instead, 
the more pessimistic estimates where the absence of wage subsidy would lead to job losses 
of all supported jobs are labelled as “high impact”, and the more optimistic estimates are 
labelled as “low impact”. The two extreme estimates help to provide the bounds of the 
estimates for the policy and the income effects.  
Table 9 Market Income (Wage, Business and Investment) Gini (Age 15-64) 
 
Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
Gini of Gross income 0.539 0.543 0.534 0.539 0.557 
Changes relative to Feb - 0.005 -0.005 0.000 0.018 
Income Shock Effect (Low impact) - 0.005 0.016 0.020 0.036 
Income Shock (High impact) - 0.005 0.115 0.121 0.139 
Policy Effect (Low impact) - 0.000 -0.020 -0.020 -0.018 
Policy Effect (High impact) - 0.000 -0.120 -0.121 -0.121 
Compared with the relatively stable gross market income inequality due to wage subsidies, 
disposable income inequality shows an apparent reduction as indicated in Table 10. 
Compared with February 2020, when the Gini was around 0.33, the Gini has been hovering 
between 0.302 to 0.305 since April. A drop of 0.03 Gini points in a few months is substantial 
given the annual change in disposable income inequality measures by the Gini index in 
Australia is usually smaller than 0.01 (Li et al., 2020).  By comparison, the change in Gini 
between 2007 and 2009 was less than 0.012 over the two years. As expected, the policy 
contributed to a substantial reduction in income inequality, which dominates the rise induced 
by the income shock as evaluated by our low and high impact estimates. This downward 
change in income inequality is not unique to Australia. A similar policy impact during the 
COVID-19 crisis was found by O’Donoghue et al. (2020) and Beirne et al. (2020) in Ireland and 
Brewer and Tasseva (2020) in the UK. They found that the wage subsidy scheme cushioned 
family income across the distribution. Coupled with the rules embedded in the tax-benefits 
systems, it provided much-needed income protection.  
Table 10 Equivalised Disposable Income Gini  
 
Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
Gini of Disposable Income 0.330 0.329 0.303 0.302 0.305 
Changes vs Feb - -0.001 -0.027 -0.027 -0.024 
Income Shock Effect (Low impact) - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 
Income Shock (High impact) - -0.001 0.042 0.046 0.048 
Policy Effect (Low impact) - 0.000 -0.026 -0.026 -0.028 
Policy Effect (High impact) - 0.000 -0.069 -0.073 -0.073 
Changes in Poverty 
As the poverty rate in Australia is often calculated after deducing housing costs, we defined 
a comparable poverty line which is 50% of the median equivalent income (OCED-modified 
equivalence scale) after the deduction of the housing cost and childcare cost. The poverty line 
is kept constant after February 2020 to enable the direct comparison before and after the 
initial COVID-19 shock. Our estimates in Table 11 suggest that the poverty rate has declined 
since the policy response to COVID-19 was implemented in April 2020. The poverty rate in 
February was around 13.5% which is consistent with the known poverty estimates in recent 
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years (ACOSS, 2020). It has subsequently declined by 5 to 6 percentage points compared with 
February and March. This outcome is in contrast to the scenario of an absent policy response, 
where the poverty rate would jump by 12 percentage point compared with the pre-COVID 
period (in the upper estimates) or slightly increase during the same period (in the lower 
estimates case).   
Table 11 After-housing poverty rate 
 
Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
Nowcast Model 13.5% 13.8% 8.0% 8.1% 8.2% 
w/o policy response (lower estimates) 13.5% 13.8% 13.8% 14.1% 14.6% 
w/o policy response (upper estimates) 13.5% 13.8% 25.8% 27.4% 28.2% 
VI.    CONCLUSIONS 
Similar to other countries, COVID-19 has had a significant impact on social and economic 
activities in Australia. Using the combined data from the monthly longitudinal labour force 
survey, payroll information and the survey of income and housing, the paper propose a 
method to reconstruct the income distribution semi-parametrically from incomplete data and 
estimates the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and the policy response on the income 
distribution. 
While COVID-19 has increased unemployment, the wage subsidy initiative from the 
government has been effective in increasing market incomes for households in the lowest 
and the second lowest income quintile, with a stabilising effect for the families situated in the 
mid-high part of the income distribution. Inequality in gross market income has generally 
been stable despite the significant shocks introduced by COVID-19. The relative positive 
outcome of the market income change is largely due to the flat rate wage subsidy for part-
time and long-term causal workers, who could receive an income exceeding their usual wage.  
On the disposable income side, we observe an increase in the living standards for most 
households except the ones in the richest income quintile since February although the 
increase is most evident in the bottom quintile similar to the change in the gross income. The 
increase in the bottom quintile can be mostly attributed to the policy response, which also 
negates the income shock effects for other quintiles. Due to the significant rise in the 
disposable income in the bottom quintile, Australia has experienced a rapid drop in income 
inequality, reducing the Gini in equalised disposable income from 0.33 to just above 0.30.  
Our analysis also suggests that, without government interventions, both gross market and 
disposable incomes would have plunged considerably, with severe consequences in terms of 
raising income inequality and poverty levels. In absence of any policy response, the poverty 
rate would have jumped in the range of 3-12 percentage point compared with the pre-COVID 
period. 
The temporary measures introduced (wage subsidy, increased benefit, free childcare) have 
successfully countered the shock, and in some metrics such as income inequality and poverty, 
dominated the impact of COVID-19, at least in short-term. Some individual policy measures, 
such as childcare and wage subsidy, are also found to have a similar impact compared with 
the findings from other countries with similar measures. While our analyses do not imply the 
measures have sheltered the shock for every household in need, the overall change in the 
income distribution does suggest the measures are generally progressive, protecting those 
who are on average more vulnerable. 
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Our results also suggest the change or the lack of change in the income distribution since the 
initial COVID-19 outbreak is heavily dependent on the temporary measures. This raises the 
question of what might happen should these policies be withdrawn. The previous global 
financial crisis has shown that countries which exceedingly rely on stimulus measures may 
experience issues with increased public debt, which may affect the sustainability of welfare 
schemes in the long term. Additionally, the presence of temporary measures may induce 
shifts in the labour market equilibrium in the long-term. These are relevant questions for 
researchers to further investigate in the future.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure A: Investment Performance (Index) of the default portfolio allocation (Balanced) of the 
Australian Super 
 
Table B: Variables used in estimating the propensity of being employed at least once since 
February 2020 
Dependent 
variable 
Whether one has been employed at least once since February 2020 
conditional on currently not in the labour force 
Independent 
variables used 
Age, age squared, education, locally born, number of children between 
age 0 and 4, number of children aged between 5 and 14, state of residence 
Sample Observations who are currently out of the labour force. Estimated 
separately for male and female, and each wave of LLFS 
 
Table C: Variables used in estimating the propensity of remaining in employment conditional 
on previously employed 
Dependent 
variable 
Whether one remains in employment  
Independent 
variables used 
Age, age squared, education, locally born, number of children between 
age 0 and 4, number of children aged between 5 and 14, state of residence 
current employment type, industry, occupation, number of usual hours 
worked, and number of jobs from the previous month 
Sample Observations who were currently employed in the previous month. 
Estimated separately for male and female, and each wave of LLFS 
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Table D Changes in Number of Employed by Industry (Original) 
 
Feb 2020 
(unit: 1000) 
May 2020 
(unit: 1000) 
Change 
(%) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 337.1 361.3 7.2% 
Mining 238.5 227.3 -4.7% 
Manufacturing 908.9 864.7 -4.9% 
Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste 
Services 
136.1 168.5 23.8% 
Construction 1182.1 1179.6 -0.2% 
Wholesale Trade 385.7 389.3 1.0% 
Retail Trade 1261.4 1182.8 -6.2% 
Accommodation and Food Services 930.5 654.3 -29.7% 
Transport, Postal and Warehousing 666.4 571.8 -14.2% 
Information Media and 
Telecommunications 
211.6 187.9 -11.2% 
Financial and Insurance Services 474.5 489.8 3.2% 
Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services 213.7 219.9 2.9% 
Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services 
1171.9 1108.9 -5.4% 
Administrative and Support Services 449.9 392.6 -12.7% 
Public Administration and Safety 828.5 846.3 2.1% 
Education and Training 1096.6 1035.8 -5.5% 
Health Care and Social Assistance 1798.3 1731.2 -3.7% 
Arts and Recreation Services 251.9 160.1 -36.5% 
Other Services 492.9 442.6 -10.2% 
Total Employed 13036.7 12214.7 -6.3% 
Source ABS Labour Force 6291.0.55.003 - Labour Force, Australia, Detailed, Quarterly, May 
2020  
 
 
 
